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A Feminist Revisit to the
First-Year Curriculum
Anita Bernstein
This article describes a seminar that I devised and have been teaching at
Chicago-Kent. Fifteen students, having got through their first year of law
school, gather with me to revisit the six subjects of that year: Civil Procedure,
Contracts, Criminal Law, Justice and the Legal System, Property, and Torts.
This time we pay primary attention to feminist concerns embedded in this
curriculum. Although the students' research papers address feminism generally, our class discussion and readings focus on the first-year curriculum, seen
both as a fixture of American legal education and as a shared immersion here
at one school.
Colleagues occasionally ask me about the genesis of the seminar, whose
seldom-spoken full name is A Feminist Revisit to the First-Year Curriculum. I
attribute some paternal influence to the constitutional scholar Charles Black,1
who in my student days taught an elective called Constitutional Law Revisited.
In his course description posted in the hallway, Black assured his prospective
students that he would make no effort to avoid chestnuts such as Marbury. "On
the contrary," he wrote; and even though I never revisited the Constitution
with Charles Black, I was instructed-then and there in the corridor-by his
course title with its short, cheerful rationale.
Law school curricula in the United States are full of revisits. In separate
individual courses and throughout the years of legal education, law professors
harp and repeat. The educational benefits of such revisits, about which Black
was so candid, are indisputable. As a pedagogical device redundancy can light
up a lesson, as anyone who has ever used a blackboard or transparencies to
repeat a point expressed orally can attest. Common ground emerges when
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For another tribute in this journal to the inspiration that Charles Black provided unknowingly, see Samuel W. Calhoun, Impartiality in the Classroom: A Personal Account of a
Struggle to Be Evenhanded in Teaching About Abortion, 45J. Legal Educ. 99, 99 (1995).
Calhoun wrote that he was consoled by Black's Reflections on Teaching and Working in
Constitutional Law, 66 Or. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1987), where Black acknowledged that he had not
found his true vocation until he was past 40.
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students hear the same concept in different classrooms: a student accepts the
importance of causation, negligence, procedure-versus-substance distinctions,
mental states, legislative history, and other staples of the curriculum because
of their ubiquitousness. Redundancy is integral to legal education, not least
2
because it distinguishes what is central from what is marginal.
Black's course title, then, invites law teachers to make their own selection.
What in the curriculum warrants the honor of a revisit? In this essay I have
nominated the entire first-year curriculum. That year has other admirers: to
many who teach there, the first year of law school is an almost sacred institution. Law professors tend to recall fondly their own first contact with the
curriculum. In their role as administrative planners, they cram the first year
with much of what they want students to take away from law school, sometimes
generating the complaint that the upper-level curriculum is empty. Curricular
reform efforts are often fixated on this first year, and proposals to change the
upper-level curriculum have referred to the energy and momentum lost by
3
the end of the crucial first year.
My own revisit to the first-year curriculum uses feminism as a unifying and
altering perspective on that tradition. I mean to give equal weight to both
feminism and the domain of the first year of study-its constituent parts and
the sum of the six courses examined. Both tribute and critique, the Feminist
Revisit seminar makes comments on various fixtures taken for granted in the
first-year curriculum, such as the canonical presentation of a sequence of
courses and the formalist core-and-penumbra structure of doctrine within
these courses.
The course also serves as an upper-level elective on feminism, often the
only one offered in the semester at Chicago-Kent, and so I have joined a
growing number of instructors who must consider the unique pedagogical
demands of this subject. Like our predecessors who built courses on midtwentieth-centuryjurisprudence and, later, on poverty law and environmental
regulation, we who teach feminism must improvise at the edge of consensus
about what belongs in the law school curriculum. From this vantage point we
get a unique look at the whole of legal education, and often a new set of
questions. Teaching feminism tends particularly to provoke thoughts about
race, hierarchy, student life, and law school governance-connections that
may be tangential or central to legal feminism. Feminist Revisit, a specialized
way to teach legal feminism, does not escape these concerns, some of which I
touch on below.
My description of the seminar in this essay is a succession of recurring
choices and dilemmas. I begin by describing its design, with my provisional
,answers to the recurring questions-What is important? What shall we read?-

2.

See Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 38 Clev. St. L. Rev. 153
(1990).

3.

See FrankJ. Macchiarola, Teaching in Law School: What Are We Doing and What More Has
to Be Done? 71 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 531, 534-35 (1995); Kristine Strachan, Curricular
Reform in the Second and Third Years: Structure, Progression, and Integration, 39J. Legal
Educ. 523 (1989).
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that accompany all of law teaching. New tradeoffs then arise. When I devised
the seminar, the most fundamental question facing me was whether to teach
instead a seminar on feminist legal theory, a freer exercise that would omit
direct reference to the first-year curriculum. The last part of the essay moves
away from the first-year curriculum and muses more generally about teaching
this lively perspective on the law; I focus on the challenge of quality control.
Feminist electives have been available in U.S. law schools for a generation.
Once a radical novelty, the law school course on feminism now enjoys official
acceptance. Obligations accompany this maturity: now that instructors are
free to teach feminism, what steps can we take to do it well?
The Seminar
Feminist Revisit follows Chicago-Kent's seminar rules (which will undoubtedly look familiar to readers who teach at other schools): two credits and onceweekly meetings, each two hours long, scheduled over a fourteen-week semester. Like all seminars at Chicago-Kent, this one is not populated entirely by
devout fans of its content or its instructor, because all students must complete
either a seminar or an equivalent independent research project after their
second year of study, and a handful of them find Feminist Revisit simply the
least of evils. Chicago-Kent also requires a research paper in each seminar, as
part of a course of study that includes legal writing in all three years of the
curriculum. 4 The students and I thus begin with constraints decreed by the
institution. An additional constraint comes from the derivative nature of the
class: we must attend to six particular substantive courses. I have not found
these limits oppressive. As I elaborate below, they may be salutary when one
teaches feminism.
Readings for Feminist Revisit are divided into two parts. The first half
(Part 1) addresses doctrinal topics regarded as "women's issues"-that is, legal
problems that may fall within the limits of Civil Procedure, Contracts, Criminal Law, Justice and the Legal System, Property, and Torts, but are nonetheless treated as peripheral. I sometimes refer to this material as the omitted
curriculum. 5 Not all of it is in fact omitted: a few of my colleagues who teach
Contracts, for instance, spend time discussing agreements to bear a child on
behalf of an infertile couple. But most of Part 1 presents topics that the
students have not yet encountered in class. Among the recurrent examples
that I cover are seduction, or sexual fraud, as a tort; prenuptial agreements
and other contracts regarding marital property; gender issues that arise in the
dissolution of marital assets; intramarital crime (including marital rape, domestic violence, and battered women's syndrome as a defense to homicide);
exclusion ofjurors on the basis of sex; and statutes of limitation that disadvantage female plaintiffs who seek redress for childhood sexual abuse.

4.

George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing- Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 333, 35758 (1987).

5.

Marjorie Maguire Shultz makes related points in The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts
and Careers, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 55 (1991).

Journalof LegalEducation

The second half of the seminar uses as a starting point the "different voice"
thesis associated with Carol Gilligan.6 We ask what first-year doctrine would
look like if it were to emphasize care and connectedness, in addition tojustice
envisioned as an individual right. Like many feminists I have deep reservations
about the notion of a uniquely feminine outlook on law, and so I try to
construe Gilligan narrowly: in the seminar we do not assume that all or even
most women have certain personality traits. Instead the different voice becomes an alternative aspect, not reliably linked to gender, that might now be
inadequately assimilated into American law.
We begin Part 2 by devoting one of our weekly meetings to discussion of the
different voice. Because this concept has been misconstrued by writers who
want to exaggerate gender difference, I direct students to Gilligan's careful
texts, both In a Different Voice and her chapter from a book on women and
moral theory.' For background I spend about a half hour on the -debate
among biologists, psychologists, and others on the extent to which genderrelated differences between females and males are innate. Throughout this
lesson I urge students to be careful and parsimonious as they draw their
conclusions. On the one hand I need to remind them that generalizations
about the male-female gender dichotomy are easy to assert, hard to prove, and
politically advantageous to those who profit from division and segregation.8
On the other hand the seminar has thus far identified itself with liberal
feminism-women-as-citizens, who are sometimes denied equality and parity
with men-and any law school course with a title like ours ought to consider
the provocations of "difference" feminism.
Apart from my belief that liberal feminism is a rich and nearly complete way
to advance the status of women, I have a second challenge in teaching the
different voice: its elusiveness. Gilligan's anecdotes and examples, about stealing from drugstores and the like (which may not prove her point, even if they
are given credence9 ) have always struck me as flimsy. Her postulates are
engaging, but they demand more detail. In class, then, I want to present
different-voice feminism using illustrations from case law: Here's a woman
whose story you can read in the case reports, and she seems different depending on whether you look at her from a liberal-feminist or a cultural-feminist

perspective.
This woman is hard to find. For a different-voice case Katharine T. Bartlett
offers In re Lamb, 0 where the California Supreme Court upheld the disbar-

6.

In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.,
1982).

7.

Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in Women and Moral Theory, eds. Eva Feder
Kittay & Diana T. Meyers, 19 (Totowa, 1987).

8.

See Carol Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman 24 (New York, 1992); Katha Pollitt, Why Boys
Don't Play with Dolls, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 46.

9.

See John M. Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender
Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. Res. 597 (1983).

10. 776 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1989).
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ment of a woman named Laura Lamb for taking the bar exam in the name of
her husband Morgan. Morgan had become despondent and violent after
failing the Texas and California bar exams; and so Laura made the unhappy
decision to cheat for him. Seven months pregnant, disguised as Morgan,
seriously ill with ketoacidosis and other acute complications of diabetes, Laura
Lamb scored ninth highest among those who took the exam that day in
California.' 2 The case is unusual in the annals of professional misconduct
nobody doubted that Laura Lamb was driven to fraud by her strained marriage, her difficult pregnancy, her husband's rages, and her longing for a
quiet home life-not the usual venality, carelessness, substance abuse, or
mental incapacitation.
I try to pose the connection thesis in different ways. First I invoke Laura as
feminine altruist, forfeiting her profession to stand by her impossible man.
Students are skeptical. Next Laura and Morgan intertwined, with Laura miserable over her husband's disgrace to a depth that Morgan never would have
known if their career experiences had been switched (would a husband ever
pose as his wife so that she, undeserving, could sneak into a learned profession?); finally the Lambs' marriage, disastrous because it had the misfortune
to defy a gender-pattern, pressing on Laura until she felt something like
compulsion. Like Bartlett I think Lamb makes a pretty good different-voice
case: Laura's gender seems pivotal to the story, in a psychological or attitudinal sense. The case appeals to the students. Liberal feminists get a chance to
point out that prior California disciplinary decisions, cited in the Lamb dissent, had treated male lawyers more gently than Laura for deeds that look
worse: cheating clients, selling drugs, suborning perjury, and soliciting a thug
to maim a former client. 3 Other students, frustrated to see Lamb disposed of
by simple recitation of California precedent, ask for a second case where
adherence to cultural feminism ought clearly to change the outcome. I
haven't found one, perhaps because the contextual inquiries of differentvoice reasoning do not lend themselves to certain outcomes.
For an alternative approach to the same problem within the criminal law, I
invoke Leona Helmsley, who both embraced and rejected the burden of
Gilligan's ethic of care. I ask students to assume, as I do, that the punishment
meted out to Helmsley for relatively minor tax evasion was harsher than usual
for this crime.' 4 Here Leona Helmsley becomes a character on our stage, and
students consider her in light of the Gilligan ideal. Her crime in a sense was
one of connectedness, with Helmsley's identity immersed in her beloved
enterprise. In her mind the line between her hotels and her self may indeed
have been erased, with improper tax deductions for personal expenses a

11. Gender and Law: Theory, Doctrine, Commentary 648 (Boston, 1993).
12. Lamb, 776 P.2d at 766 n.2.
13. Id. at 774 (KaufmanJ., dissenting).
14. In United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991), an appellate panel affirmed all of
Helmsley's convictions but remanded for a more lenient sentence. Helmsley eventually
served 18 months, spendingsome of this time in comfortable quarters, and paid $8 million in
fines and restitution. See The Forbes Four Hundred, Forbes, Oct. 16, 1995, at 135.
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natural result. Like Laura Lamb, Helmsley suffered for the sake of her husband, who I think would not have escaped prosecution without her. We then
switch to a more familiar character, the Queen of Mean, the martinet who
believed that "only the little people pay taxes" (a remark she plausibly.denied
having made), an antithesis of care and connection.' 5 Was Leona made to pay
6
because of her indecorous contempt for the feminine role? She has said so.'
Images of a different voice may have harmed her twice (or at least a liberal
feminist would think she was harmed) in that they first caused her to take the
rap for Harry and later punished her for noncompliance with a stereotype.
As we move on to consider the different voice in areas of the first-year
curriculum, I continue to present this issue using case law and specific examples. Often this presentation leads me to exploit cases for nondoctrinal
purposes, much as I rewrite Leona Helmsley into parables about gender and
culture rather than see her as The Defendant in a tax prosecution. With this
approach Iam following a lead of MaryJoe Frug, who appropriated Allied Van
Lines, Inc. v. Bratton7 to make points about gender never intended by Mrs.
Bratton, her lawyer, or the judicial author of the opinion. 8 In Vokes v. Arthur
Murray, Inc.,19 another contracts case that I sometimes use in Part 2, Audrey
Vokes, who signed an unfortunate contract to buy thousands of hours of
20
dance lessons, emerges in free brush strokes painted by Robert W. Gordon.
This postmodernist exercise sometimes makes students uneasy. No litigant in
Feminist Revisit case law ever asked to bejudged by the standard of a different
voice; and so a few students object to what they see as a violation, or second
victimization.
When I am in luck, another student will counter that old-fashioned doctrine exploits individuals' lives in an similarly nonliteral and nonconsensual
fashion. One unique human being metamorphoses into, say, "the prosecutrix" or "the respondent"; her ambivalence into "laches" or failure to make a
"prompt complaint"; her baby into a "nonfungible good." And our tropes and
metaphors join a first-year curriculum tradition replete with peppercorns,
eggshell skulls, hairy hands, long arms, unborn widows, bundles of sticks, and
Mary Carter agreements. Our tactics in the seminar are closer to business-asusual than they first seem. Looking for the different voice in contracts,
property, criminal law and torts cases can freshen the students' perspective on
the common law method.

15. See Gail Collins, Women in Power Who Give Women a Bad Name, Redbook, Oct. 1995, at
100; Ex-Inmates Say Helmsley Played Queen in Prison, Orlando Sentinel,Jan. 29,1994, atA2.
16. See Glenn Plaskin, Playboy Interview: Leona Helmsley, Playboy, Nov. 1990, at 65.

17. 351 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1977).
18. See Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U. L. Rev.
1065, 1125-34 (1985).
19. 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
20. See Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 195 (1987);
for elaboration see Dale A. Nance, Law and Justice: Cases and Readings on the American
Legal System 360 (Durham, 1994).
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New looks at case law, however, occupy only a minority of Part 2 readings;
most readings come from the academy. We revisit contract law via the work of
Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil, who have argued for a relational perspective on the subject. 2' Feminist scholars such as Mary Joe Frug, Elizabeth
Mensch, and the student-professor team of Patricia A. Tidwell and Peter
Linzer have extended relational contract theory by pointing out its similarities
to the ethic of care.22 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, expounding on a women's
lawyering process, suggests a feminist approach to civil procedure nicely
augmented by Judith Resnik on gender issues in federal jurisdiction.2 3 Carol
Rose combines game theory and feminism to outline her thoughts on women
and property, to which I sometimes add Margaret Jane Radin on quasiinalienable personal property or residential rent control. 24 Leslie Bender has
an ambitious feminist theory of accident law that applies the ethic of care to a
range of tort topics: negligence, strict liability, and the measure of damages.'
with
Finally, we cover our uniquejustice and the Legal System first-year course
26
an article by Karen Busby on gender bias in analytic legal philosophy.
To these readings that we discuss in class I add a two-part writing requirement. The students' major project is an original research paper on a topic
related to women and the law. Students choose their own topics after meeting
individually with me. I prefer, but do not absolutely require, that the paper
relate to an area within the first-year curriculum: among the occasional
exceptions have been a paper on gender bias in vocational high school
education and one on Title VII sexual harassment. Almost always, however,
the first-year curriculum pertains to the students' theses. Their second writing
requirement, called Reactions, is a one-page assessment of the readings for
each class meeting, where the student reflects on the assignment and suggests
write Reactions for four of
some questions to be raised in class. Students must
2
the twelve classes where readings are assigned. 1

21. Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 465; Macneil, The New Social
Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven, 1980).
22. See Frug, supra note 18; Tidwell & Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid: Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 791 (1991).
23. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process,
1 Berkeley Women's LJ. 39 (1985); Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1682 (1991).
24. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 Va. L. Rev. 421 (1992); Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987); Residential Rent Control, 15 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 350 (1986).
25. A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. Legal Educ. 3 (1988); Changing the
Values in Tort Law, 25 Tulsa LJ. 759 (1990).
26. The Maleness of Legal Language, 18 Manitoba L.J. 191 (1989).
27. Out of the fourteen scheduled meetings, I cancel one in the middle and hold private
conferences with the students instead; another class is a writing lab where I teach diction,
grammar, and other elements of expository writing.
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Feminist Revisit and Feminist Jurisprudence
Courses called Feminist Legal Theory, 28 FeministJurisprudence,2 Sex Discrimination,30 Social Policy and Feminist Legal Thought,3' and Women and
the Law,32 among many variations on this theme, have enriched the American
legal curriculum for decades: a handful of them were around even in the
1960s, when Ruth Bader Ginsburg was teaching at Rutgers.3 Casebooks on the
subject have achieved renown,-1 and my rough count indicates that about 150
full-time law school teachers offer an elective on some approximation of
Women and the Law. 5
Soon after elective courses about women/feminism/sex discrimination

began to flourish, scholars and teachers started to use feminist theory as a
method to inform the study of more familiar subjects in the curriculum.
Today the teacher or writer interested in feminist issues embedded in almost
any traditional law school subject-contracts, torts, constitutional law, evi-

dence, property, criminal law, income tax, international law, trusts and estates, clinical teaching, labor law, corporate law-can explore an ample literature. The growth of feminism-plus-doctrine in addition to feminist legal
theory suggests a cogent curricular pattern for law teachers who combine legal
feminism with a traditional doctrinal specialty. They can teach the feminist

jurisprudence elective from time to time, and flavor the rest of their courses
with a bit of perspective.36
Feminist Revisit reflects a different choice. I favor the flavor, as it were, and

add feminism as a perspective when I teach Torts, Products Liability, Jurispru-

28. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829,829 n.* (1990); Patricia
A. Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Difference and Exploring
Connections, 38J. Legal. Educ. 165, 165 (1988).
29. Morrison Torrey et al., Teaching Law in a Feminist Manner: A Commentary from Experience, 13 Harv. Women's LJ. 87 (1990).
30. Ann E. Freedman, Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism and
Homophobia in Law School, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 849, 852 (1990).
31. Cheryl B. Preston, Joining Traditional Values and Feminist Legal Scholarship, 43J. Legal
Educ. 511,515 (1993).
32. James J. White, Letter to Judge Harry Edwards, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2177, 2182 n.1 (1993)
(reciting Michigan elective curriculum).
33. Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening Consciousness in the Law Schools, 5
Val. U. L. Rev. 480,480-81 (1971).
34. See Bartlett, supra note 11; Mary Becker et al., Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking Women
Seriously (St. Paul, 1994); MaryJoe Frug, Women and the Law (Westbury, 1992) (published
posthumously).
35. This count comes from the AALS Directory of LawTeachers, which uses Women and the Law
as an umbrella designation covering gender, feminism, and sex discrimination. Course titles
on this subject proliferate in bewildering array; it is not clear whether, say, Women and the
Law is always less "radical" than Gender and the Law.
36. I do not mean to exaggerate a gap between courses that explicitly address the condition of
women and those that do not. Gender and "women's issues" are found everywhere in the
curriculum. See Judith Resnik, Visible on "Women's Issues," 77 Iowa L. Rev. 41 (1991).
Whenever I teach, I presume that a "perspectives" influence in the traditional curriculum
conveys some of Resnik's point about pervasiveness.
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dence, and Professional Responsibility; but I have decided to teach Feminist
Revisit rather than a traditional elective on feministjurisprudence. The tradeoffs
of this choice may interest readers who face a similar dilemma in devising a
balanced array of course offerings and in deciding how to present feminist
legal theory to their students.
One great benefit of Feminist Revisit, unavailable in a feminist jurisprudence course, is a grounding in specifics outside feminism. Six extrinsic
reference points keep the seminar firmly in contact with "reality"-that is, our
shared manmade environment. I seldom worry about roaming too far afield.
As our discussions expand through the semester, students tend to specialize in
the first-year course they liked best (Criminal Law seems to be the winner
here), and so they can relate feminism to another subject where they feel
confident, even masterful. The first-year curriculum takes shape as a coherent
whole, as students build connections among the subjects.
Our attention to the first-year curriculum unites the students and me
around a shared reference point that would be unavailable in a feminist
jurisprudence elective. This reference point can be a burden sometimes.
When I want to discuss expectation damages versus reliance damages and they
want to gossip about their Contracts professor, I temporarily wish for an
absence of remembered details. More often, however, the students and I are
grateful for the guideposts of their traditional first-year experience. The
variety of the first-year curriculum also encourages us to keep moving. I would
tend to overrely on torts for illustrations if I were not continually reminded to
look elsewhere. (The seminar has also provided an impetus for me to become
more competent in basic doctrine outside my research interests.)
That the students have all been through the first year of law school yields a
related benefit: an improved presumption of legitimacy for the seminar. A few
students are angry about the curricular omissions that I detail in Part 1, but
nobody in Feminist Revisit has ever expressed a belief that the first-year
curriculum wastes their time with trivia. Students believe that the first-year
curriculum is entitled to its privileged status, and therefore Feminist Revisit,
reiterating some of this curriculum, shares in this entitlement.
With our bridge to tradition in place, feminism becomes not only a perspective on the American legal system but a force that can combat student
passivity and immaturity. The seminar asks them to think about the required
curriculum of their most crucial year in law school. This challenge, I hope,
reminds students that somebody designs legal education, ranking priorities and
connecting innovation with continuity. Ourjumpingfrom one first-year course
to another in an effort to survey the whole conveys a message about opportunity costs, especially scarce time. Asking "the woman question,"37 we follow
trails blazed by some of the most gifted theorists of the American legal
academy (as well as the university) yet stay in a framework suited to the
analytic talents of second- and third-year students. Ideas have consequences,
or so academics like to say; and Feminist Revisit, never far from the pragmatics

37. Bartlett, supranote 28, at 837.
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of course schedules, lesson goals, and the mediation of conflicts, describes
feminist theory as a task for planners who care about legal education. A course
on feminist legal theory can achieve a similar effect, of course, but in Feminist
Revisit this connection to the entire curriculum is more fundamental.
In comparing the costs and benefits of Feminist Revisit versus a course on
feminist legal theory, I do not mean to polarize the two approaches. Comparing the two courses leads to a collection of two-sided coins: many conditions of
Feminist Revisit can be seen as both advantages and disadvantages. For example, our ties to the traditional curriculum increase the "legitimacy" of the
seminar, as I've said, but they may also send a conservative message to the
students: stay within bounds, don't go far, don't be radical. Another example:
Feminist Revisit inherently lacks a full sense of history. A course on feminist
jurisprudence can begin with antiquity and end with today's newspaper and
the current Supreme Court certiorari docket; but our material, like the firstyear curriculum on which it is based, resists chronological presentation. I
bring in history occasionally-Married Women's Property Acts, the common
law refusal to punish marital rape and spousal battery-but only in small
increments. Yet a historical approach to feministjurisprudence raises its own
problems: it can create the misimpression that once the law was bad but now it
has enlightened itself. Wide-breadth-shallow-depth is the side of another coin
I have chosen; someone else might prefer to cover less territory in greater
depth, and for that purpose feminist legal theory would work better than
Feminist Revisit.
A clear disadvantage of Feminist Revisit over a feminist legal theory course
lies in its commitment to a curriculum with little statutory law and (at ChicagoKent) few references to the Constitution and no international or comparative
law. Even Civil Procedure, our first-year course least associated with the
common law method, is vulnerable to this problem. I feel a pang or two about
what we omit: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fourteenth Amendment, the
1970s crusade for an equal rights amendment to the Constitution (now too
distant to be remembered by the students), the EEOC guidelines on sexual
harassment, and international covenants on human rights. Certainly the
absence of statutes presents first-year subject matter in a misleading light.,8 In
reaction to this concern I sometimes assign a statute or portions of the Model
Penal Code, but always with the sense of a tradeoff: when I use materials
absent from the first-year curriculum I veer from the theme of Revisit and the
common law methods of analogy, synthesis, and accretion. I compromise
by permitting students to write their papers on statutory, administrative,
constitutional, international or comparative law. Despite this measure, the
seminar underdescribes the legal terrain amenable to feminist reinterpretation and reform.
Other feminist roads that I seldom travel include law-and-literature analyses using texts such as Antigone and The Handmaid's Tale; studies of language
38. The complaint that law school curricula overemphasize appellate opinions at the expense of
statutes is a venerable one. See Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Training for the Public Profession of
the Law 285 (Carnegie Found. Bull. No. 15, New York, 1921).
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and epistemology; critiques of legal ethics or professional responsibility (although the Lamb case touches on this subject); and detailed study of the
relationship between feminist legal theory and other twentieth-century jurisprudential movements, of which legal realism and critical legal studies are
especially important. Yet the Feminist Revisit format does not preclude some
contribution from these quarters. I find I have the time to mention them allvery briefly. The first-year-curriculum theme forfeits some opportunities, but
not to any preemptive extent.
A final drawback of Feminist Revisit is psychological: students can find it
distressing to return to their first year of law school. The seminar celebrates
and reinforces that year, and past curricular content shapes our readings and
discussion, but for many students the first year cannot be recalled without
pain. Like many law teachers I have fond memories of my own first year of
school, which I like to remember as wonderful. To help bridge this gap
between them and me, I have added a Postscript to the readings, consisting of
Stephanie M. Wildman's article about women's silence in the classroom39 and
The Legal Education of Twenty Women," on the subtle discomforts of first-year
students at Yale. 41 Often I run out of time before we can discuss these final
readings, but I refer to them during the semester and encourage the students
not to flinch as they recall their own first year in feminist hindsight.
Reflections on Quality Control
When I started planning a feminist revisit to the first-year curriculum, I
immersed myself in the literature on the pedagogy of feminism in law schools,
which was well underway back then in 1992,42 and has since grown. These law
review articles made my seminar possible; they provided me with theory,
pragmatics, and an encouraging sense of fellowship and extended community. At the risk of sounding ungrateful, however, I want to comment here on
a shortcoming of this writing. Some of it implies that reader and writer alike
are to be congratulated for superior enlightenment, and the literature tends
to ignore the possibility that feminism might be taught badly in law schools.
Law school courses on feminism may tend inherently to escape tough
scrutiny and to deflect unwelcome criticism. Colleagues are usually not
equipped to judge the readings or pedagogy used in the course. Victimconsciousness makes it easy for instructors to turn complaints back (often with

39. The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38J. Legal Educ. 147
(1988).
40. Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev.
1299 (1988).
41. One of my students read ahead to the Postscript and decided early in the semester to write
her research paper expanding the empirical findings of The LegalEducationof Twenty Women.
She devised a questionnaire similar to the one used in the Weiss & Melling article, this time
looking for differences in attitudes between women students who had attended single-sex
colleges and those who had attended coed colleges. After completing her paper, she
expanded her research design to study women students attending other Chicago law schools.
42. See Paul M. George &Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77
Iowa L. Rev. 87, 87-100 (1991).
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justification) on the critic who expresses them. Legal feminism has no canon
of what must be taught-indeed, it has had plenty to say against the idea of a
law school canon 43-and so its adherents can insulate themselves from criticism about omissions. While in some law schools it may take bravery for an
instructor to identify herself as a feminist and offer an elective on gender and
the law, more commonly such a choice does notjeopardize a career but rather
creates the danger that one will teach without effective feedback.
Although I am concerned that law school courses on feminism may be
critic-proof to the point that the courses suffer, I do not mean to recommend
the unquestioning absorption of negative comments from students, colleagues,
administrators, or friends. It may be worth repeating that sexism still flourishes. So does reactionary thinking. New approaches to the law school curriculum still threaten some faculty who interpret innovations as personal attacks.
Critical perspectives on the law still bear a burden of proof, an obligation to
refute student skepticism, that does not weigh on noncritical perspectives.
External criticism, then, is likely to be no more helpful than self-triumph to
those instructors who seek to improve their teaching of legal feminism. Here I
propose a third way: self-questioning. I enumerate below some of the pitfalls
that I consider when evaluating Feminist Revisit each year, which I believe are
pertinent to other law school courses on feminism.
Ethnocentrism
Volumes have been written about the white and upper-middle-class biases
embedded in mainstream academic feminism. This concern is important to
teachers as well as theorists, especially when the teachers and the majority of
their students are white. In this typical setting, the instructor will usually not
be charged with prejudice if she ignores race in her teaching of feminism; yet
this ethnocentrism will almost certainly be present in her classroom. I think of
ethnocentrism as ineradicable. My own enrollments in Feminist Revisit have
run about fifteen percent African-American, high when seen as a ChicagoKent percentage but in reality just a handful of black women, called on
continually to do extra educative work, despite my attempts not to tolerate the
exploitation of these students for their "voice." 44
What to do? Is black feminism different from white feminism, and can an
instructor of any color transcend, or perhaps deliberately teach, the subject of
race in American law? Having known only seminar-size enrollments in Feminist Revisit, I am unable to theorize about black feminists and white feminists
in the classroom, but I notice that my white students seem to house their
feminism in a relatively rigid container, while their African-American classmates mingle feminism with attention to other socially created dividers, including economic status and family membership. Often committed to a larger
project of liberation, African-American students in my seminar have little

43. See, e.g., Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 Cal. L.
Rev. 1512 (1991).
44. Very few Latina or.Asian-American students have enrolled in Feminist Revisit.
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patience for any feminism that will not, in Kate Bartlett's phrase, "illuminate
other categories of exclusion." 45 While I do not apologize for my attention to
one matrix-gender-in Feminist Revisit, I try to continue the multipleinputs theme of our revisit to six courses as I struggle with the omnipresence
of ethnocentrism.
Accommodation of Change
Another inquiry that I think the teacher of feminism should nurture
pertains to the way she accommodates changed circumstances. No two law
school classes are alike, and it may be true that courses on feminism react to
these differences more profoundly than other courses do. New student enrollments yield different working conditions. Both enthusiasm and skepticism
about feminism can dominate class discussions. Small changes in the level of
male enrollment can make a big difference. And current events affect lesson
plans: headliners like O.J. Simpson and Lorena Bobbitt, I recall, generated
both enlightening and unenlightening discussions.
Accommodation of change demands vigilance. Of course, keeping current
in one's field is necessary for teachers of any subject, but I think that a law
school course on feminism is particularly vulnerable to becoming stale in at
least three respects. First, the instructor likely has assembled some of her
materials, and for this reason may feel pride of handiwork that obstructs
revision. Second, the instructor receives external inputs for the course only
sporadically. For my Torts, Products Liability, and Professional Responsibility
courses, I can passively wait for the mail to bring casebooks, treatises, newsletters, and AALS announcements; for Feminist Revisit I must be proactive.
These two points are not unique to feminism; they describe any boutique
elective. My third concern about staleness, however, applies to electives
that are activist or explicitly political in their focus: this kind of course
can wither when its auteur gets discouraged about, or disengaged from, the
struggle. Classroom approaches must shift to accommodate these changes
in enthusiasm.
One type of change that affects the teaching of feminism in law school
comes from college campuses. Increasing numbers of undergraduates receive
training about diversity, multiculturalism, and sensitivity about the ethnic
origin and sexuality of classmates. I have found myself inadvertently speaking
buzzwords and provoking memories of a (fairly recent) freshman orientation
program. Campus rape, pornography, fraternity regtilation, and speech codesas well as the question of whether "feminist" is a loathsome label-are among
the many issues perceived differently by my current students than by their
predecessors of a few years back. These political winds will continue to shift. It
is worthwhile, I think, for the teacher of legal feminism to keep an eye on what
goes on atAmerican colleges, even if they seem remote:' afew minutes aweek
reading the Chronicle of HigherEducationor LinguaFrancacan pay off.

45. Bartlett, supra note 28, at 834.
46. This distance feels especially wide at law schools like Chicago-Kent that have little contact
with an affiliated undergraduate institution.
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Women as Victims
"Feminism shouldn't be only about avoiding responsibility," a student once
remarked in my class. "Why do we always hear about protecting women? I
think we should think about responsibilities and duties." This comment came
at the end of Part 1 in the seminar-after I had queried whether sexual fraud
should be actionable by the deceived, and suggested that women were entitled
to more alimony, more protection by the criminal law, and additional theories
to help them escape specific performance of surrogacy contracts. (I hadn't
even got to the different-voice argument that might have made a contract
voidable in Allied Van Lines v. Bratton.) I paused. Had I indeed been teaching
"victim feminism," that plump target of so many women writers who complain
about whining?47
Teaching feminism generates a dilemma about victims. The activist premise
of such courses requires the instructor to present complaints about injustice.
As we combine feminism with instruction about the American legal system,
instructors necessarily focus on societal problems, and ask how the law has
fostered conditions that impose detriment based on gender. Yet feminist legal
theory pays heed to praxis-especially the engaged effort that results from
political consciousness 48 -and requires participation. This goal of enlistment,
a civilian Be All That You Can Be, conflicts with victim-consciousness, especially when the population that one seeks to engage consists mainly of sheltered and privileged young women who prefer to think of themselves as
winners. Add to this mismatch a touch of American antideterminism-especially the myth that one makes it on one's own, and that those who falter
should blame themselves-and feminism can get an image problem among
the students.
In class I have argued that complaining is different from whining. Torts
vocabulary familiar from the first-year curriculum-trespass,plaintiff complaint,
even tort itself-indicates etymologically that in the American legal tradition it
isjust fine for individuals to mount a law-based protest against injustice. When
students accuse a litigant or scholar of whining, I sometimes ask them whether
they would react so disapprovingly if the complaint were based on a condition
other than gender. What bothers them about feminist complaining? Students'
responses are often thoughtful and revealing. Sometimes they think that the
importance of a problem has been exaggerated. Sometimes they worry about
the overprotection and paternalism that are inherent in relying on legal
shelter for vulnerable women.4 9 Sometimes they compare our protagonists
unfavorably with women they have known who coped better with equally
demanding stresses. As these discussions get going, other students often

47. See Christina Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Women
(New York, 1994); Camille Paglia, Vamps and Tramps: New Essays (New York, 1994); Katie
Roiphe, The MorningAfter Sex, Fear, and Feminism on Campus (Boston, 1993).
48. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635 (1983).
49. For exploration of these concerns, see Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave--Can
Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social Change in the 1990s? 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1252 (1993).
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defend the criticized litigant or theorist, thereby helping us to focus on what
makes a complaint compelling-an inquiry that is integral to learning how to
build a lawyerly argument.
All that said, however, I think that the question of responsibility warrants
class time in a course on feminism. The ethic of care, when misused, can slide
into a lazy ethical relativism, where none can judge and where "context,"
never fully revealed to us onlookers, is always available to excuse. I have tried
to press my students more on the question of where they believe feminists
ought to be more tough-minded. The strain of self-help rhetoric in AfricanAmerican writing may provide a useful parallel, although I happen to dislike
most of what I read about bootstraps; my predilections aside, any instructor
must deal carefully with analogies between race and gender (and the notion
that race means black while gender means women).
Men Students
Law school courses on feminism give men a chance to experience the
conditions that go with gendered minority status: self-consciousness' about
their bodies; the possibility that they will be stereotyped, scapegoated, or
misunderstood because of a genotype that they did not choose; and a course
presentation that does not treat their gender as the universal human norm.
This opportunity can be extraordinarily valuable to men especially if, like
most male law students, they are white. Few sign up for the chance, in my
experience. The percentage of male students in the seminar has been growing
slowly, but the first two times I offered Feminist Revisit we had a 14:1 female/
male ratio.
The gender dynamic among students deserves attention. Especially when
enrollments are small enough for students to know that they are distinct
individuals in the eyes of the instructor, it is safe and effective to prod them
into noticing the function of gender in class. Many students, for instance, are
familiar with the popular work of Deborah Tannen, whose bestsellers describe
the effects of gender in day-to-day language,"0 and a feminism course makes a
natural setting for continuing these observations. The instructor should react
to what she sees. Consistent with my commitment to liberal feminism I strive
to treat men and women equally in my classes; a different-voice feminist might
use a contrary approach to connect theory and pedagogy.51 Another way to
learn from the gender dynamic in one's feminism classes is to invite an
outsider to the class (to give a guest lecture perhaps) and later ask the visitor
how gender seemed to function in the room.

50. Talking from 9 to 5 (New York, 1994); You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in
Conversation (NewYork, 1990); That's Not What I Meant! How Conversational Style Makes
or BreaksYour Relations with Others (NewYork, 1986).
51. On "equal treatment" versus "equitable treatment" see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist
Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law
School," 38J. Legal Educ. 61 (1988).
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All overview elective courses, including courses on women or on feminism,
present law teachers with the chance to assert their own priorities. The theme
of repetition in Feminist Revisit doubles this chance. Whether instructors
choose to teach a now-traditional elective on feminist jurisprudence or an
alternative like Feminist Revisit, the classroom occasion is a solemn opportunity. Law teachers must think about what in the curriculum needs feminist
reinforcement; whether their goals are well founded and attainable; which
omissions in the standard curriculum carry hidden gender messages and thus
warrant mention; and how to respect feminism's ideals ofjustice while teaching a diverse and unequally situated group of students.
Toward these ends, feminist teachers can benefit from descriptions of
feminist knowledge. I have argued that we must work to know whether we are
teaching effectively. Feminist Revisit offers a retrospective and ajudgment on
the first-year curriculum-an institution that law teachers at least accept, and
often help to construct. Elective courses on legal feminism, which similarly
blend the old and new, also demand a retrospective and judgment by those
who teach them.
When they look back and evaluate, law teachers participate in an eclectic
feminist tradition.Just as activists use "the master's tools"52 to advance reform
while staying alert to the flaws of these tools, instructors create change when
they reexamine tradition. This process leads to the construction of new kinds
of knowledge. Feminist theorists, as Kate Bartlett has elaborated in Feminist
Legal Methods, have absorbed the insights of postmodernism, without becoming submerged under its despair. They have written about different vantage
points and yet remain hopeful that human beings of good will can cooperate
even though they stand in different places.5 3 I offer Feminist Revisit in this
spirit. My students and I find new terrain there whenever we return.

52. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches 110 (Freedom, Cal., 1984).
53. See Bartlett, supranote 28, at 867-80.

